In addition to being the world's largest wine producer, the European Union is also the world's most regulated wine market. In 2007, the EU decided on a major reform of its wine policy, the so-called Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine. A crucial element was the abolishment of the planting rights system, a set of regulations limiting the planting of new
other arguments, again using summary statistics. A more elaborate empirical study by Bogonos et al. (2012) focuses on Rheinland-Pfalz. However, so far none of the studies use or provide a conceptual or theoretical framework to study the effects of planting rights.
Our paper is the first to conceptually analyze the likely effects of planting rights in the wine sector and the effects of their reforms. The analysis of planting rights is different from conventional quota systems, since planting rights impose a constraint on the use of land in viticulture while conventional quota systems limit output (e.g. the EU sugar and dairy quotas).
Because planting rights impose a constraint on the use of land, the system not only has an impact on the market for wine but also direct effects on the land market. Hence, one needs to simultaneously consider the markets for output (wine), inputs (land), and quotas (planting rights).
We present an integrated theoretical model of the market for land, for planting rights and the market for wine which allows us to analyze the welfare effects and distributional effects of the planting rights system by taking into account both the effects on land markets and in the wine market.
We then extend our model to take into account specific features of the planting rights system. We discuss the impact of enforcement problems in implementing planting rights, and
show how enforcement problems reduce the efficiency losses associated with planting rights but have distributional effects. We also analyze how trade in planting rights across different wine regions affects the welfare effects, and we analyze the impact of trade restrictions. These effects are analyzed first for the case of a small open economy with perfectly elastic demand for wine and then for the case of a large economy with more inelastic demand. We then discuss the system of regional and national reserves of planting rights.
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Our final section draws some conclusions with regard to the likely impact of liberalization on the EU wine sector. Our model shows that, as with any policy reform, the end of planting rights creates both winners and losers. Among the winners are consumers, who benefit from larger supplies of wine at lower prices. Owners of land other than vineyards also gain, because of the increase in land prices. A third group of winners are the new entrants into the sector, who will have the opportunity of planting vineyards while they were unable to do so before the liberalization. The losers are the original vineyard owners, as the total value of their vineyards decreases and additionally they face lower prices for their wines.
